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Abstract
One finds, in Maxwell’s writings on thermodynamics and statistical physics, a con-
ception of the nature of these subjects that differs in interesting ways from the way
that they are usually conceived. In particular, though—in agreement with the cur-
rently accepted view—Maxwell maintains that the second law of thermodynamics, as
originally conceived, cannot be strictly true, the replacement he proposes is different
from the version accepted by most physicists today. The modification of the second
law accepted by most physicists is a probabilistic one: although statistical fluctuations
will result in occasional spontaneous differences in temperature or pressure, there is
no way to predictably and reliably harness these to produce large violations of the
original version of the second law. Maxwell advocates a version of the second law that
is strictly weaker; the validity of even this probabilistic version is of limited scope,
limited to situations in which we are dealing with large numbers of molecules en masse
and have no ability to manipulate individual molecules. Connected with this is his
concept of the thermodynamic concepts of heat, work, and entropy; on the Maxwellian
view, these are concepts that must be relativized to the means we have available for
gathering information about and manipulating physical systems. The Maxwellian view
is one that deserves serious consideration in discussions of the foundation of statistical
mechanics. It has relevance for the project of recovering thermodynamics from statis-
tical mechanics because, in such a project, it matters which version of the second law
we are trying to recover.
Keywords: Thermodynamics; Second Law of Thermodynamics; Entropy; James
Clerk Maxwell; Maxwell’s Demon.
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I carefully abstain from asking the molecules which enter where they last started
from. I only count them and register their mean velocities, avoiding all personal
enquiries which would only get me into trouble.
James Clerk Maxwell, quoted in Garber et al. (1995, p. 19).
1 Introduction
The nineteenth-century physicists who developed the kinetic theory of heat and laid the
groundwork for the science that we now statistical mechanics had to wrestle with the impli-
cations of their work for thermodynamics. On the kinetic theory, heat is not a substance, but
rather is associated with kinetic energy of molecules. Moreover, on the kinetic theory, the
second law of thermodynamics,as originally conceived, cannot be strictly correct, although
a suitable successor to it could be. These considerations require a reconceptualizaton of
thermodynamics.
One of those who thought deeply about the relations between the theories was James
Clerk Maxwell, and the conclusions that he came to about the scope and limitations of the
second law of thermodynamics, and about the nature of the distinction between work and
heat, deserve to be better known. For Maxwell, no matter of physical principle precludes
the operations of a Maxwell demon; it is only our current, but perhaps temporary, inability
to manipulate molecules individually that prevents us from doing what the demon would be
able to do. For Maxwell, the distinction between work and heat is not absolute, but relative
to the means we have of keeping track of the motion of molecules and of manipulating them.
It follows from this that the difference in thermodynamic entropy between two equilibrium
states of a system is also means-relative.
In this paper the Maxwellian view of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics will
be presented, together with Maxwell’s reasons for holding such a view. In the final section
the viability of the view will be considered, and it will be argued that, at the very least, no
conclusive refutation of the view exists in the literature. I conclude that the view is one that
ought to be on the table for serious consideration, in our discussions of the foundations of
statistical mechanics.
2 Three second laws of thermodynamics
It has become a commonplace that there are two distinct versions of the second law of
thermodynamics. The original deems it impossible that there be a transfer of heat from a
cooler body to a warmer body without a compensating increase of entropy of some other
body (to paraphrase Clausius’ formulation).This is in tension with the kinetic theory of heat,
which leads us to expect that the thermal agitation of molecules will give rise to fluctuations
of temperature and pressure. These fluctuations entail that a gas that is initially at a
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uniform temperature and pressure can spontaneously develop differences in temperature or
pressure—a decrease (however slight) in entropy, which need not be compensated by an
increase elsewhere.
What most physicists today accept is something along the lines of,
Although fluctuations will occasionally result in heat passing spontaneously from
a colder body to a warmer body, these fluctuations are inherently unpredictable;
there can be no process that will consistently and reliably transfer heat from a
cooler to a warmer body without producing a compensating increase in entropy
elsewhere.
Call this the probabilistic version of the second law of thermodynamics.
In the decade 1867–1877, the major figures in the development of the kinetic theory
came to accept that the second law would have to be modified. Considerations of reversibility,
which show that anti-thermodynamic behavior is not ruled out by the laws of mechanics,
were instrumental in this for Maxwell, Thomson, and Tait, as they were for Boltzmann (see
(see Uffink 2007, Brown et al. 2009, for discussions of Boltzmann’s probabilistic turn).
The reversibility argument is spelled out in a letter, dated Dec. 6, 1870, from Maxwell
to John William Strutt, Baron Rayleigh; Maxwell follows this with an exposition of what
we now call Maxwell’s demon,1 and then draws the
Moral. The 2nd law of thermodynamics has the same degree of truth as the
statement that if you throw a tumblerful of water into the sea, you cannot get
the same tumblerful of water out again (Garber et al., 1995, p. 205).
Maxwell’s demon makes its first public appearance in Maxwell’s Theory of Heat (1871), in
a section entitled, “Limitation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.”
Gibbs’ recognition of the probabilistic nature of the second law occurs in 1875. His
statement occurs in the context of a discussion of the mixture of distinct gases by diffusion,
with which there is associated an increase of entropy, called the entropy of mixing.
when such gases have been mixed, there is no more impossibility of the separation
of the two kinds of molecules in virtue of their ordinary motions in the gaseous
mass without any external influence, than there is of the separation of a homoge-
neous gas into the same two parts into which it as once been divided, after these
have once been mixed. In other words, the impossibility of an uncompensated
1Although Maxwell says that it was William Thomson (who was to become Lord Kelvin) who gave the
creatures this name (Knott, 1911, p. 214), Thomson attributes the name to Maxwell:
The definition of a “demon”, according to the use of this word by Maxwell, is an intelligent
being endowed with free will, and fine enough tactile and perceptive organisation to give him
the faculty of observing and influencing individual molecules of matter (Thomson, 1874, p.
441).
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decrease of entropy seems to be reduced to improbability (Gibbs 1875, p. 229;
1961, p. 167).
It is one thing to acknowledge that, given artificial and contrived initial conditions, such as
the reversal of all velocities, or those produced by the manipulations of a demon, violations
of the second law could be produced. This is enough to show that the second law cannot be
a consequence of molecular dynamics alone. Such considerations leave open the possibility
that such conditions would, in the normal course of things, be so improbable that they would
expected to occur very rarely if at all. Maxwell went a step further; he asserted that, on
small enough scales, the second law will be continually violated.
If we restrict our attention to any one molecule of the system, we shall find its
motion changing at every encounter in a most irregular manner.
If we go on to consider a finite number of molecules, even if the system to which
they belong contains an infinite number, the average properties of this group,
though subject to smaller variations than those of a single molecule, are still
every now and then deviating very considerably from the theoretical mean of the
whole system, because the molecules which form the group do not submit their
procedure as individuals to the laws which prescribe the behaviour of the average
or mean molecule.
Hence the second law of thermodynamics is continually being violated, and that
to a considerable extent, in any sufficiently small group of molecules belonging to
a real body. As the number of molecules in the group is increased, the deviations
from the mean of the whole become smaller and less frequent; and when the
number is increased till the group includes a sensible portion of the body, the
probability of a measurable variation from the mean occurring in a finite number
of years becomes so small that it may be regarded as practically an impossibility.
This calculation belongs of course to molecular theory and not to pure thermo-
dynamics, but it shows that we have reason for believing the truth of the second
law to be of the nature of a strong probability, which, though it falls short of cer-
tainty by less than any assignable quantity, is not an absolute certainty (Maxwell
1878b, p. 280; Niven 1965, pp. 670–71).
The second law of thermodynamics, as originally conceived, must be acknowledged
to be false. A plausible successor to it is the probabilistic version. Maxwell, also, thought
that a suitably limited version of the second law could be correct. But for Maxwell, even a
probabilistic version holds only so long as we are in a situation in which molecules are dealt
with only en masse. This is the limitation of which he speaks, in the section of Theory of
Heat that introduces the demon to the world.
One of the best established facts in thermodynamics is that it is impossible in
a system enclosed in an envelope which permits neither change of volume nor
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passage of heat, and in which both the temperature and the pressure are every-
where the same, to produce any inequality of temperature or pressure without
the expenditure of work. This is the second law of thermodynamics, and it is
undoubtedly true as long as we can deal with bodies only in mass, and have no
power of perceiving the separate molecules of which they are made up. But if
we conceive of a being whose faculties are so sharpened that he can follow every
molecule in its course, such a being, whose attributes are still as essentially as
finite as our own, would be able to do what is at present impossible to us. For
we have seen that the molecules in a vessel full of air at uniform temperature are
moving with velocities by no means uniform, though the mean velocity of any
great number of them, arbitrarily selected, is almost exactly uniform. Now let
us suppose that such a vessel is divided into two portions, a and b, by a divi-
sion in which there is a small hole, and that a being, who can see the individual
molecules, opens and closes this hole, so as to allow only the swifter molecules
to pass from a to b, and only the slower ones to pass from b to a. He will thus,
without expenditure of work, raise the temperature of b and lower that of a, in
contradiction to the second law of thermodynamics.
This is only one of the instances in which conclusions which we have drawn from
our experience of bodies consisting of an immense number of molecules may be
found not to be applicable to the more delicate observations and experiments
which we may suppose made by one who can perceive and handle the individual
molecules which we deal with only in large masses.
In dealing with masses of matter, while we do not perceive the individual molecules,
we are compelled to adopt what I have described as the statistical method of cal-
culation, and to abandon the strict dynamical method, in which we follow every
motion by the calculus (Maxwell, 1871, pp. 308–309).
Note that there is in this no hint that there might be some principle of physics that precludes
the manipulations of the demon, or constrains it to dissipate sufficient energy that the net
change of entropy it produces is positive. Moreover, Maxwell leaves it open that the requisite
manipulations might become technologically possible in the future—the demon does what is
at present impossible for us. What Maxwell is proposing, as a successor to the second law,
is strictly weaker than the probabilistic version. For Maxwell, even the probabilistic version
is limited in its scope—it holds only in circumstances in which there is no manipulation of
molecules individually or in small numbers.
3 Work, heat, and entropy as means-relative concepts
Maxwell’s conception of the status of the second law ties in with his conception of the status
and purpose of the science of thermodynamics.
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Central to thermodynamics is a distinction between two ways in which energy can be
transferred from one system to another: it can be transferred as heat, or else one system can
do work on the other. The second law of thermodynamics requires, for its very formulation,
a distinction between these two modes of energy transfer. In Clausius’ formulation,
Heat cannot pass from a colder body to a warmer body without some other
change connected with it occurring at the same time.2
To see that this hangs on a distinction between heat and work, note that it becomes false if
we don’t specify that the energy is transferred as heat. It is not true that no energy can be
conveyed from a cooler body to a warmer body without some other change connected with
it: if two gases are separated by an insulating movable piston, the gas at higher pressure
can compress—that is, do work on— the gas at lower pressure, whatever their respective
temperatures.
The Kelvin formulation of the second law is,
It is impossible, by means of inanimate material agency, to derive mechanical
effect from any portion of matter by cooling it below the temperature of the
coldest of the surrounding objects (quoted in Uffink 2001, p. 327).
This statement does not say that we cannot cool a body below the temperature of the
coldest surrounding objects. Refrigerators are possible. The difference is: though we can
derive mechanical effect—that is, do work— by extracting heat from a hotter body, using
some of the energy to do work, and discarding the rest into a cooler reservoir, extraction of
heat from a body that is already cooler than any body that might be used as a reservoir
requires the opposite of deriving mechanical effect: it requires us to use up some energy that
could have been used for mechanical effect, in order to effect the transfer. Thus the Kelvin
statement, also, requires a distinction between deriving mechanical effect from a body and
extracting heat from it.
What is this distinction? On the kinetic theory of heat, when a body is heated, the
total kinetic energy of its molecules is increased, so, for body A to heat body B, parts of
A must interact with parts of B to change their state of motion. When A does work on B,
it is again the case that parts of A act on parts of B to change their state of motion. The
difference is: in heat transfer, energy is transferred to the parts of the body in a haphazard
way; the resulting motions cannot be tracked. This limits our ability to recover the energy
as work.
Put this way, the distinction seems to rest on anthropocentric considerations, or,
better, on consideration of the means we have available to us for keeping track of and
manipulating molecules. We shall call considerations that turn on the means available to
an agent for gathering information about a system or for manipulating it means-relative;
2“Es kann nie Wa¨rme aus einem ka¨lteren Ko¨rper u¨bergehen, wenn nicht gleichzeitig eine andere damit
zusammenha¨ngende Aenderung eintritt.” Quoted by Uffink (2001, p. 333).
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these are matters that can vary between agents, but it would be misleading to call them
subjective, as we are considering limitations on the physical means that are at the agents’
disposal. On Maxwell’s view, the distinction between work and heat is means-relative.
Available energy is energy which we can direct into any desired channel. Dissi-
pated energy is energy we cannot lay hold of and direct at pleasure, such as the
energy of the confused agitation of molecules which we call heat. Now, confusion,
like the correlative term order, is not a property of material things in themselves,
but only in relation to the mind which perceives them. A memorandum-book
does not, provided it is neatly written, appear confused to an illiterate person, or
to the owner who understands thoroughly, but to any other person able to read
it appears to be inextricably confused. Similarly the notion of dissipated energy
could not occur to a being who could not turn any of the energies of nature to his
own account, or to one who could trace the motion of every molecule and seize it
at the right moment. It is only to a being in the intermediate stage, who can lay
hold of some forms of energy while others elude his grasp, that energy appears to
be passing inevitably from the available to the dissipated state (Maxwell 1878a,
p. 221; Niven 1965, p. 646).
That there is some energy that, for us, counts as dissipated energy has to do, according
to Maxwell, with the large number and small size of the molecules that make up a macroscopic
body.
The second law relates to that kind of communication of energy which we call
the transfer of heat as distinguished from another kind of communication of
energy which we call work. According to the molecular theory the only difference
between these two kinds of communication of energy is that the motions and
displacements which are concerned in the communication of heat are those of
molecules, and are so numerous, so small individually, and so irregular in their
distribution, that they quite escape all our methods of observation; whereas
when the motions and displacements are those of visible bodies consisting of
great numbers of molecules moving all together, the communication of energy is
called work (Maxwell 1878b, p. 279; Niven 1965, p. 669).
If heat and work are means-relative concepts, then perforce so is entropy. The entropy
difference between two equilibrium states of a system is given by
∆S =
∫ d¯ Q
T
,
where the integral is taken over any quasistatic process joining the two states, and d¯ Q is the
increment in heat absorbed from the system’s environment. Thus, on Maxwell’s view, the
very concepts required to state the second law of thermodynamics are means-relative.
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One argument that Maxwell gives for the conclusion that the distinction between
available and dissipated energy is means-relative is based on considerations of the entropy
of mixing, which, as we have seen above, was also the context of Gibbs’ remark about the
probabilistic character of the second law. Consider a container with two sub-compartments,
of volume V1 and V2, respectively, containing samples of gas at the same temperature and
pressure. The partition is removed, and the gases from the two subcompartments are allowed
to diffuse into each other. Has there been an increase of entropy, or not?
Maxwell gives the now standard answer, that, if the gases are the same, there is no
entropy increase, but, if they are distinct, then there is an increase of entropy equal to the
entropy increase associated with free expansion of the two gases from their initial to their
final volumes. He then comments on this distinction:
Now, when we say two gases are the same, we mean that we cannot distinguish
the one from the other by any known reaction. It is not probable, but it is
possible, that two gases derived from different sources, but hitherto supposed to
be the same, may hereafter be found to be different, and that a method may be
discovered of separating them by a reversible process (Maxwell 1878a, p. 221;
Niven 1965, pp. 645–646).
On Maxwell’s view, whether or not the interdiffusion of two gases involves an increase of
the entropy of the system is not a feature of the physical change alone, but has to do with
the abilities of the agent. An agent who saw no way to separate two gases would not regard
their interdiffusion as a lost opportunity to do work. Any distinction between the gases that
is irrelevant to their capacity to do work is irrelevant to their thermodynamic state, so such
an agent would regard the beginning and end states as the same thermodynamic state, and
hence judge no increase in entropy.
If we are in possession of a means to separate the gases—say, a membrane permeable
to one gas and not to the other3— then we can connect the initial and final states by a
reversible process in which each gas expands, raising a weight, while absorbing heat from a
reservoir. In such a process, the gas has increased its entropy, while decreasing the entropy
of the reservoir.
Thus, an agent with superior means of manipulation would be able to perform what
looked to another agent like a violation of the second law of thermodynamics. Suppose that
Bob regards the samples of gas in two compartments separated by a partition as identical.
Alice, on the other hand, knows a difference between them and is in possession of membranes,
each permeable to one gas but not the other. She can isothermally expand each gas, raising
a weight as she does so, while extracting heat from a reservoir. On Bob’s parsing of things,
the beginning and end states of the gas are counted as the same, and it looks as if Alice has
used the gas as a heat engine with perfect efficiency. Alice, of course, does not regard the
3As Daub (1969, p. 329) points out, the device of a membrane permeable to one gas but not the other,
now a staple of textbook expositions, dates back to Boltzmann (1878).
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process as a violation of the second law, as she does not regard the initial and final states of
the gas as the same thermodynamic state.
If we were to discover a hitherto unsuspected difference between two types of molecules,
one that permitted us to perform manipulations that could not otherwise have been done,
we would not say that the second law of thermodynamics, in any version, had been violated;
we would revise our estimates of the entropy of some systems involving these molecules.
One can imagine the process of refining our ability to manipulate molecules to go on with-
out limit, with consequent revisions in our estimate of entropy of systems. In such a case,
there would be no absolute answer to the question of what the entropy difference of two
equilibrium states of a system is.
So far we have been discussing differing means of manipulating molecules in bulk.
These yield differing judgments concerning the value of the entropy change of a system as
it goes from one equilibrium state to another. If, however, there were an agent capable of
manipulating individual molecules, then, according to Maxwell, the distinction between heat
and work would break down. “[W]e have only to suppose our senses sharpened to such a
degree that we could trace the motions of molecules as easily as we now trace those of large
bodies, and the distinction between work and heat would vanish, for the communication of
heat would be seen to be a communication of energy of the same kind as that which we
call work” (Maxwell 1878b, p. 279; Niven 1965, p. 669). As long as we are dealing with
molecules in bulk, we can distinguish between work, consisting of change of macroscopic
variables, and heat, energy distributed in a disorderly manner among many molecules. But
from the perspective of a Maxwell demon, there would be no distinction between heat and
work, and the very concepts needed to formulate the second law would break down, and
thus the second law would be inapplicable, because the very concepts needed to formulate
it would fail to apply. Its machinations would, however, look like a violation of the second
law, as formulated using any distinction between heat and work.
4 Significance for Statistical Mechanics
There is more than historical interest in all of this. If it is a goal of statistical mechanics
to recover the laws of thermodynamics, then it matters which version of the second law is
to be recovered. If the very concepts of thermodynamics are means-relative, then it will be
necessary to invoke means-relative considerations in the task of finding statistical-mechanical
analogs of thermodynamic quantities. If the scope of what is to be recovered is limited to
situations in which large numbers of molecules are being treated in bulk, then we can expect
to invoke some version of the law of large numbers.
What one would expect to be able to derive from statistical mechanics, on Maxwell’s
view, might be something akin to the following. The object of our study will be a system
with a large number of degrees of freedom. Our knowledge of the state of the system is
limited to a small number of quantities, which, typically, will involve sums of a large number
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of molecular quantities and so, on a probability distribution on which the states of the
molecules are independent (as will be the case for equilibrium distributions) these will have
small dispersion, and so having precise knowledge of their values will be compatible with
considerable ignorance of the microstate of our system. It is in terms of these quantities
that we define the thermodynamic state. We also distinguish between types of interaction
of the system with its environment. In many circumstances, the forces to which a system
is subject can be partitioned into terms dependent on a small number of parameters that
we can manipulate (think of the positions of the walls of the container), plus terms that
are effectively random (interaction with a heat bath). Energy imparted to (or taken from)
the system via changes of the controllable external parameters is to be counted as work;
all other energy transfer between the system and the environment, as heat. Assume that
there is a reliable relation between the values of the known variables and the controllable
parameters (equation of state). On the Maxwellian view, the second law should say that,
given such a distinction between manipulable and uncontrollable parameters, and between
the known parameters, used to define the thermodynamic state, and the unknown, there can
be no process that predictably and reliably has the effect of converting heat energy entirely
into work and with no net change in the thermodynamic states of the systems involved.
This is considerably weaker than the second law of thermodynamics as usually con-
strued. In particular, it says nothing at all about whether it might become possible to
convert quantities that are at present beyond our cognizance into knowable quantities, and
parameters that we do not currently count as manipulable into manipulable ones. As a
consequence, this version places no absolute limits on what can and cannot be done.
A view similar to Maxwell’s has, in more recent years, been championed by E.T.
Jaynes, who expresses his view as “Entropy is an anthropomorphic concept.”4
If we work with a thermodynamic system of n degrees of freedom, the experi-
mental entropy is a function Se(X1 · · ·Xn) of n independent variables. But the
physical system has any number of additional degrees of freedom Xn+1, Xn+2,
etc. We have to understand that these additional degrees of freedom are not to
be tampered with during the experiment on the n degrees of interest; otherwise
one could easily produce apparent violations of the second law (Jaynes 1965, p.
398; Jaynes 1989, p. 86).
Jaynes proposes his own modification of the second law.
the correct statement of the second law is not that an entropy decrease is impos-
sible in principle, or even improbable; rather that it cannot be achieved repro-
ducibly by manipulating the macrovariables {X1, ..., Xn} that we have chosen to
define our macrostate (Jaynes, 1992, p. 10).
This is much in the spirit of a Maxwellian view of thermodynamics.
4Jaynes attributes this phrase to Wigner. He arrives at this position via a close reading of Gibbs (1875),
and the view, as in Maxwell, is motivated by consideration of the entropy of mixing.
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5 On the meaning of “statistical”
For Maxwell, the truth of the second law is “a statistical, not mathematical, truth” (1878b, p.
280). In a letter to Tait he wrote that the chief end of a Maxwell demon is to “show that the
2nd Law of Thermodynamics has only a statistical certainty” (quoted in Knott 1911, p. 215).
To a modern reader, used to the idea that statistics and probability theory are intimately
intertwined, there may seem to be no discernible difference between a statistical version of
the second law and a probabilistic one. Indeed, Maxwell has been read as employing his
demon in the service of a probabilistic version of the second law. For example, Earman and
Norton write,
Maxwell conceived of the Demon as a helpful spirit, assisting us to recognise
most painlessly that the Second Law of thermodynamics can hold only with
very high probability, apparently in the sense that there is a very small subclass
of thermodynamic systems that assuredly reduce entropy (Earman and Norton,
1998, p. 436).
If the demon is meant to illustrate the fact that the second law can only hold with high
probability, then, it must be admitted, the example is not well chosen. As Maxwell himself
pointed out, statistical fluctuations will produce violations of the original version of the
second law, without the help of a demon. The passage of faster molecules from one side of
a container to the other through the demon’s trap door will happen occasionally, without
the presence of the demon to close it to block unwanted passages. What the demon does
is build up a substantial difference in temperature by selectively accumulating fluctuations
that occur without its intervention. So, the demon does not help us see that the original
second law will be violated; rather, it exploits microscopic violations to build up macroscopic
ones. Equally puzzling is the notion that the demon helps us see that the second law will
hold with high probability; in the presence of the demon, large entropy decreases are not
improbable, but virtually certain.5
If the probabilistic reading is not what was meant, what did Maxwell mean when he
said that the demon’s chief end was to show that the second law has only a statistical cer-
tainty? In order to understand this, it is essential to understand what the word “statistical”
meant, for Maxwell. The word “statistics” has its origin in the Italian statista (statesman),
and originally referred to a collection of facts of interest to a statesman. By the nineteenth
century the word had come to be applied to systematic compilation of data regarding popu-
lation and economic matters (Hald, 1990, pp. 81–82), and this would have been the primary
meaning of the word for Maxwell’s readers.
In 1885, in his address to the Jubilee Meeting of the Statistical Society of London,
the Society’s president, Rawson W. Rawson, defined statistics as
5Earman and Norton’s take on this seems to be that, though, in the presence of a system that acts
as a Maxwell demon, entropy will assuredly be reduced, such systems are rare, so that we can expect
thermodynamic behaviour from most systems.
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the science which treats of the structure of “human society,” i.e., of society in
all its constituents, however minute, and in all its relations, however complex;
embracing alike the highest phenomena of education, crime, and commerce, and
the so-called “statistics” of pin-making and London dust bins (Rawson, 1885, p.
8).
There is no suggestion in Rawson’s address that statistics and probability theory are closely
interconnected, though he does note that “mathematical principles of investigation are avail-
able, and, the more closely these are applied, the nearer will be the approach to mathematical
precision in the results” (p. 9). This is a symptom of the degree to which the field has been
transformed; imagine the current president of the Royal Statistical Society (as it is now
known) reminding its membership that mathematical methods are available!
Although there were, of course, mathematicians who were at the time applying prob-
ability theory in the field of statistics, this was not yet the dominant approach.
In the social sciences ... the successful use of probability-based statistical methods
did not come quickly... But beginning in the 1880s there was a notable change
in the intellectual climate... (Stigler, 1986, p. 239).
Writing in the 1870s, Maxwell could not have assumed that his readers would associate the
word “statistical” with considerations of probability.
In a lecture delivered to the British Association for the Advancement of Science
(1873), Maxwell discussed the introduction of the statistical method into physics.
As long as we have to deal only with two molecules, and have all the data given
us, we can calculate the result of their encounter; but when we have to deal with
millions of molecules, each of which has millions of encounters in a second, the
complexity of the problem seems to shut out all hope of a legitimate solution.
The modern atomists have therefore adopted a method which is, I believe, new
in the department of mathematical physics, though it has long been in use of
the section of Statistics. When the working members of Section F [the statistical
section of the BAAS] get hold of a report of the Census, or any other document
containing the numerical data of Economic and Social Science, they begin by
distributing the whole population into groups, according to age, income-tax,
education, religious belief, or criminal convictions. The number of individuals is
far too great to allow of their tracing the history of each separately, so that, in
order to reduce their labour within human limits, they concentrate their attention
on a small number of artificial groups. The varying number of individuals in each
group, and not the varying state of each individual, is the primary datum from
which they work.
This is, of course, not the only method of studying human nature. We may
observe the conduct of individual men and compare it with that conduct which
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their previous character and their present circumstances, according to the best
existing theory, would lead us to expect (Maxwell 1873, p. 440; Niven 1965, pp.
373–74).
To adopt the statistical method in physics means to eschew the attempt to follow the
trajectories of individual molecules—“avoiding all personal enquiries” of molecules—and, on
Maxwell’s view, it is only insofar as we do so that the second law is applicable.
It had long been noted that, though the behaviour of individual humans might be
hard to be predict, there are statistical regularities at the population level. So, too, says
Maxwell, there are statistical regularities in physics.
The data of the statistical method as applied to molecular science are the sums of
large numbers of molecular quantities. In studying the relations between quanti-
ties of this kind, we meet with a new kind of regularity, the regularity of averages,
which we can depend upon quite sufficiently for all practical purposes, but which
can make no claim to that character of absolute precision which belongs to the
laws of abstract dynamics (Maxwell 1873, p. 440; Niven 1965, p. 374).
It is this that he means when he says that the second law is a statistical regularity. “The
truth of the second law is ... a statistical, not a mathematical, truth, for it depends on the
fact that the bodies we deal with consist of millions of molecules, and we can never get hold
of a single molecule” (Maxwell 1878b, p. 279; Niven 1965, p. 670).
There is, of course, a relation between a probabilistic version of the second law,
and a restriction of its scope to circumstances in which molecules are dealt with en masse,
rather than individually. As Maxwell points out, measurable thermodynamic quantities are
averages over many molecular quantities; if the molecular quantities exhibit fluctuations that
are probabilistically independent of each other, these fluctuations will tend to be washed out
as the number of molecules considered is increased. Thus the probabilistic version predicts
that large deviations from the original version of the second law will become overwhelmingly
improbable when macroscopic numbers of molecules are involved, and so it shares with
Maxwell’s version the conclusion that the original version will be observed to hold under
ordinary conditions of observation of macroscopic phenomena. This helps to explain why
Maxwell has been taken to be advocating the probabilistic version widely accepted today.
Though a number of writers have attributed the probabilistic version of the second
law to Maxwell—the quotation from Earman and Norton, above, is not atypical—it should
be noted that Stephen Brush, in his masterful study of the development of the kinetic theory,
does not. Brush correctly notes that the lesson Maxwell draws from the demon is that “the
Second Law ... ‘has only a statistical certainty’—it is valid only as long as we consider very
large numbers of molecules which we cannot deal with individually.” Brush adds,
It must not be assumed that “statistical” here implies randomness at the molec-
ular level, for it is crucial to the operation of the Maxwell Demon that he be able
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to observe and predict the detailed course of motion of a single molecule (Brush,
1976, p. 589).
Maxwell’s interpretation of the second law, Brush notes, “is statistical rather than stochastic”
(Brush, 1976, p. 593). Owen Maroney, also, clearly distinguishes Maxwell’s view from the
probabilistic version. The operation of Maxwell’s demon is
simply a matter of scale and the statistical nature of the second law not proba-
bilistic, but due to our inability to discriminate the exact state of a large number
of particles (similar to our inability to exploit Loschmidt’s reversibility objection).
This leaves open the possibility of a device which could discriminate fluctuations
in individual atomic velocities and it is not clear that any probabilistic argument
would prevent work being extracted from this (Maroney, 2009).
6 Exorcising the Demon?
Most contemporary physicists believe in something considerably stronger than this Maxwellian
law. We should ask whether we have good reason to believe the stronger version; and this
is the question of whether we have reason to believe whether there could be a device that
played the role of Maxwell’s demon, predictably and reliably converting what we (presently)
regard as heat entirely into useful work. A reply that the second law is a well-confirmed
inductive generalization would not be persuasive. On the Maxwellian view, the second law
is valid in situations in which there is no manipulation of individual molecules, and these
are the circumstances of the observations that form our basis for induction. That something
has never been observed is not a good argument that it is not technologically feasible; we
are familiar with phenomena that can be be produced artificially but which occur rarely, if
at all, in nature. A convincing argument would have to derive the probabilistic second law
from some principle for which we can provide independent grounds.
There is an extensive literature that attempts to do just this (see Leff and Rex (2003)
for an overview, some of the key papers, and an extensive bibliography). There are two
main avenues of approach. One, pioneered by the work of Smoluchowski, consists of careful
analysis of devices that prima facie might seem to be able to function as Maxwell demons,
to show that this appearance is an illusion due to neglect of thermal fluctuations in some
part of the mechanism. The other avenue employs information-theoretical concepts in an
endeavour to locate an unavoidable dissipation of energy either in the act of information
acquisition, or in information processing. Along this avenue, the approach that seems to
find most favour currently invokes Landauer’s Principle, according to which erasure of a
record that represents n bits of information inevitably results in a minimum average entropy
increase of n k ln 2, where k is Boltzmann’s constant.
Earman and Norton (1998, 1999) argue that, insofar as arguments of this sort are
sound, they beg the question by assuming the probabilistic second law. They are particu-
larly skeptical of the notion that informational considerations can shed much light on the
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matter. Indeed, introduction of such notions may seem like a fundamentally ill-conceived
endeavour, as many proposed demonizing schemes seem to involve no part that plays the
role of an information processor. Moreover, as Zhang and Zhang (1992) have shown, if
one is willing to countenance dynamics that does not preserve phase voluume, then an
entropy-decreasing device can be constructed, and there seems no natural way to construe
the operation of Zhang and Zhang’s device as involving information acquisition or processing.
“[A]nthropomorphising of the Demon is a mistake” (Earman and Norton, 1999, p. 4).
even if the operation of the Demon involves what deserves to be called an informa-
tion processor of computer—a dubious assumption in some cases—the ultimate
explanation for the possibility or impossibility of various operations must be
traced to fundamental physical laws, laws which are stated without the mention
or use of information concepts. One thus suspects that at best what information
considerations can offer us is a handy heuristic (Earman and Norton, 1999, p.
24).
“At best”; the bulk of Earman and Norton’s discussion suggests that invocation of infor-
mational considerations more commonly serves as a smoke-screen to hide the fact that the
second law is being assumed as a premise, only to be rederived as a conclusion.
The Maxwellian view casts an interesting light on this literature. If the very concepts
of thermodynamics are means-relative, and we cannot even state the second law of thermo-
dynamics without invoking an means-relative distinction between heat transfer and doing
work, then anthropomorphising the demon no longer seems like a mistake. On Maxwell’s
view, dissipation of energy simply is the transfer of energy from degrees of freedom we
keep track of to ones that we don’t. Landauer’s principle, on this view, looks, not like an
unprovable and dubious assumption, but a tautology.
If Landauer’s principle is a tautology, though, it will be of no avail in determining
what is and isn’t physically possible. If all we will obtain from statistical mechanics is
an agent-relative version of the second law, this will be of no use in determining which
manipulations might be feasible, and which are not. So, even if we accept that information-
theoretic conceptions deserve a central place in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics,
they are out of place in determining what can and can’t be done physically. For this, we
need to look to physics itself, and, as Earman and Norton have argued, no argument of the
requisite sort has been produced.
In light of all this, the Maxwellian view, whether it is correct or not, is one that
deserves to be on the table in discussions of the foundations of statistical mechanics. We
should take seriously the idea that thermodynamic concepts are inherently means-relative.
If we are dealing with large numbers of molecule in bulk, there will usually be a notion of
dissipation of energy that is sufficiently clear that, in practice, we can employ thermodynamic
concepts in such a way that ambiguity is kept small enough that it doesn’t become a nuisance,
but, if the Maxwellian view is correct, it would be a mistake to search for absolute physical
meaning of these concepts.
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